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ORTHODOXY A:ND HERESY 
Eleonore Stump 
Alvin Plantinga's "Advice to Christian Philosophers" had the effect of getting 
contemporary Christian philosophers to recognize themselves as a part of a 
community with a worldview different from that found in the rest of Jcade-
mia, and to take seriously in their work their commitment to that distinct 
worldview. I argue that in the current climate of opinion, generated at least in 
part by Plantinga's advice, it would be worthwhile for contemporary Christian 
philosophers to consider that we also belong to a community of Christians that 
extends across centuries, and to ask what we are committed to by our partici-
pation in that larger community. 
In troduction 
Alvin Plantinga's "Advice to Christian Philosophers'" had the effect of get-
ting contemporary Christian philosophers to recognize themselves as a 
part of a community with a worldview different from that found in the rest 
of academia, and to take seriously in their work their commitment to that 
distinct worldview. Plantinga's advice generated some controversy when 
he first presented it; but, in my view, it has had a very beneficial effect on 
philosophy as it is now practiced by Christian philosophers. Many people 
took his advice to heart, and the result is noticeable not only in the research 
of Christian philosophers in recent years but also more generally in an 
increased willingness on the part of Christian philosophers to remember 
and reflect on Christian standpoints in the pursuit of all their professional 
duties. In the current climate of opinion, generated at least in part by 
Plantinga's advice, I think it would be worthwhile for contemporary 
Christian philosophers to consider that we also belong to a community of 
Christians that extends across centuries, and to ask what we are committed 
to by our participation in that larger community. 
One of the issues that such reflection raises has to do with the distinc-
tion between orthodoxy and heresy. 
There is, of course, a problem here. Serious use of the word 'heresy' is 
guaranteed to raise anxiety and indignation or even fury. 
In Pakistan it is against the law to say things about God that the authori-
ties judge contrary to Islamic orthodoxy. Several years ago, the Pakistani 
law made headlines in this country when a fourteen-year old Pakistani boy 
was sentenced to death for disobeying that law. The Prime Minister of 
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Pakistan at that time, Benazir Bhutto, said that she was shocked at the 
boy's predicament, but that she could not interfere with the law. Cases like 
this make us feel that focus on orthodoxy is plainly pernicious and that 
acceptance of the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy tends only to 
promote social injustice. 
When we look at religious history, we certainly find ample support for 
such a feeling. Among Christians, Catholics have persecuted Protestants, 
and Protestants have persecuted Catholics-in each case because the 
offending group failed to hold the beliefs that the dominant group took to 
be required for orthodoxy. As far as that goes, Protestants have persecuted 
other Protestants for heresy-Calvin was instrumental in the burning of 
Servetus, for example-and Catholics have fought endlessly among them-
selves. In the Middle Ages, the seculars fought with the mendicants, the 
Dominicans were regularly at odds with the Franciscans, and the 
Franciscans themselves were split over the issue of monastic poverty. And, 
of course, Christians have no monopoly on persecution in the name of 
orthodoxy. Think about the conflicts between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, 
for example, or the contemporary conflicts between fundamentalist and 
liberal Muslims in north Africa. Devotion to orthodoxy has been a stimu-
lus to violence and oppression, across cultures and times. 
We are so far from fighting for orthodoxy in religion in academic circles 
now that we are positively embarrassed by the very distinction between 
orthodoxy and heresy. We are not surprised that antiquarians-scholars 
interested in history just for history'S sake-would take an interest in the 
distinction. But apart from antiquarian investigations, we tend to take men-
tion of heresy as a figure of speech at best and as right-wing extremism at 
worst. It is still possible, if rare, to hear someone publicly make an accusa-
tion of religious heresy, but those who hear the charge are more likely to 
wish that the accuser would go away than that the accused would reform. 
In fact, many academics, even those with strong religious commitments 
of their own, find any attempt to uphold the distinction between ortho-
doxy and heresy in religion offensive. Someone who wants to distinguish 
the orthodox from the heretical seems to be claiming not only to know the 
truth but to know it better than her heretical neighbors, whose views she 
regards, disrepectfully, as false. Gordon Kaufman speaks for people who 
feel this way about the distinction when he says/ 
the new consciousness of the significance of religious pluralism, the 
growing awareness of the way in which all our ideas are shaped by 
the cultural and symbolic framework of orientation within which we 
are living and thinking, the sensitivity to Christian responsibility for 
certain aspects of the massive evils which confront us today ... [all] 
tend to promote a deep humility about the religious and philosophi-
cal traditions we have inherited and a profound questioning of the 
propriety of making dogmatic claims of any sort with regard to their 
ultimate "reality" or "truth."3 
I do want to take the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy serious-
ly. But in the atmosphere suggested by this quotation, it seems to me a 
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good idea to qualify my thesis about orthodoxy and heresy before I say 
what the thesis is and give advice to go with it. In fact, the bulk of this 
paper will consist in qualifications; the advice comes in only briefly, at the 
end. This is a modest, seemly approach to giving advice. 
First Two Qual{fications 
Here is the first qualification. Although I am going to take seriously the 
notion of heresy, I think the notion of heretic should be discarded for any 
purpose other than historical description. That's because a heretic is sup-
posed to be someone who is committed to a heresy and who because of his 
heresy is worthy of being thrown out of the community of the orthodox! 
But it's a great mistake to suppose that one can make a legitimate inference 
from the appropriateness of rejecting a belief to the appropriateness of 
rejecting the person who holds that belief. A person might hold a belief 
which no reasonable person would consider orthodox, and yet that person 
might be someone whom the community of the orthodox should admire 
and extol for spiritual excellence. 
To see what I mean, consider the story of William Hunter in Foxe's Book 
of Martyrs.' I won't tell you what I take Hunter's heresy to be, just in case I 
didn't succeed in picking an example of a doctrine which no reasonable 
person could take as Christian orthodoxy.6 Use your imagination and pick 
some theologica 1 position which in your own view is not only theologically 
beyond the pale but philosophically illiterate as well. Imagine that to be 
Hunter's heresy, and in my view you won't be far off the mark. But if in 
fact you go to the relevant passages of Foxe and find that you don't think 
as I do about Hunter, trust me: somewhere in the history of religious perse-
cutions in Britain, there is someone whom you would evaluate as I evalu-
ate Hunter. Feel free to substitute that person for Hunter in this context. In 
the same spirit, I should point out that Foxe isn't generally considered the 
best authority on the history of martyrs; but if the story he tells isn't accu-
rate in all its details (or even any of them), there is some story just like it 
somewhere which is accurate. 
According to Foxe, William Hlmter was a nineteen-year old apprentice 
during the reign of Queen Mary, who was convicted of heresy by the 
Catholic authorities in his region. The authorities gave Hunter every 
opportunity and every incentive to recant. The bishop put him in stocks, 
imprisoned him, and even tried to bribe him with the offer of a job and a 
large sum of money; in the end, the bishop just threatened him with execu-
tion if he didn't recant. But the teenager was as oblivious to threats as to 
bribery, and he maintained his position steadfastly. When he was finally 
condemned to be burned to death as a heretic, he comforted his weeping 
mother by telling her, "For the little pain I shall suffer, which shall soon be 
at an end, Christ has promised me, mother, a crown of joy. Should you not 
be glad of that?" And he was burned to death with the words of the 51 st 
Psalm on his lips: "a broken and a contrite heart, 0 God, thou wilt not 
despise."7 Perhaps his theology was hopeless; but, as for the man himself, 
who among us is worthy to sit next to him? 
In my view, then, it is a wretched mistake to judge a person's Christian 
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character or his standing with God on the basis of a judgment that some of 
his Christian beliefs are not orthodox.8 As the story from Foxe's Book of 
Martyrs shows, a person can hold a belief which is not orthodox and yet be 
someone whose Christian excellence is far beyond our own. 
Here is the second qualification of the as yet unstated thesis. It's an even 
more lamentable mistake to suppose that coercion of any sort should be 
used to stamp out unorthodox beliefs.' As the history of attempted repres-
sion shows, it is not possible to have a society which uses coercion against 
beliefs it wants to eliminate without making that practice known to those 
in the society. The result is that, even if (mirabile dictu) the beliefs that soci-
ety is trying to protect are all true, the coercive practices of that society will 
nonetheless undermine love of truth. Those who hold orthodox beliefs will 
realize that it is prudent for them to do so, so that whatever love of truth 
brings them to orthodox beliefs, their acceptance of those beliefs will also 
be motivated by prudential considerations. Those who are undecided 
about orthodox beliefs will weigh them with mingled concern for truth 
and for their own well-being. And those who pride themselves on their 
unwillingness to let prudential considerations motivate their adherence to 
religious beliefs will be more inclined to reject than to accept the truth of 
orthodox beliefs, because to accept them in such a society is not to seek the 
truth but to yield to pressure. Even those who reject orthodoxy, then, will 
evaluate orthodox beliefs with some self-regarding concern-for ensuring 
their independence of political pressure-and will be more inclined to the 
role of rebel than to the seeking of truth. So in virtue of choosing coercive 
means to try to protect truth, a society docs serious damage to the love of 
truth. This is bound to be a concern for any community, but it's disastrous 
for the Christian community. 
So those are my first two qualifications of the thesis which I haven't yet 
expressed. It's wrong and self-defeating for Christians to judge harshly a 
person's standing with God solely because he holds unorthodox beliefs or 
to bring any political pressure on such a person to change his views. There 
is actually one more qualification important for my purposes here, but I'd 
like to put it in the more usual place, after the statement of the thesis it 
qualifies. I hope that these two qualifications relieve enough of the anxiety 
generated by taking seriously the distinction between orthodoxy and 
heresy that we can now tum to the nature of the distinction itself. After 
that, I'll say what my thesis is. 
One more preliminary point 
There are lots of questions raised for Christians by the distinction 
between orthodoxy and heresy. For example, how does one decide which 
beliefs count as orthodox for Christians? If one came to hold beliefs sup-
posed on some grounds to be orthodox, how would one be justified in the 
higher-order belief that those grounds were the right ones? Or, again, is 
Christian orthodoxy compromised by accomodation with local non-
Christian religions, such as that exemplified by the Jesuit missionary 
Matteo Ricci in 16th-century China?lO As far as that goes, what are we to 
think about Christendom's past missionary efforts? Without missionary 
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concern that religiously orthodox beliefs be shared by people everyvvhere, 
would the west African slave trade, for example, have prospered as it did 
in the early modern period?l1 What is the relation between orthodoxy and 
political domination of marginal groups? Has orthodoxy been used as an 
excuse for oppressing women or people of other races and ethnic groups? 
All of these are good questions; all of them are questions that interest me. 
But none of these questions is at issue in what I want to talk about here. 
I want to talk about something that is preliminary to all these questions, 
namely, the very distinction between orthodoxy and heresy. Furthermore, 
it is clear that upholding the legitimacy of the distinction is compatible 
with very different answers to the questions I mean to leave to one side. 
Tomas de Torquemada and Matteo Ricci, for example, both cared deeply 
about Christian orthodoxy. But Torquemada's care for orthodoxy brought 
it about that at least two thousand people were killed for their unorthodox 
beliefs and 160,000 Jews were expelled from their homes, while Ricci's care 
for orthodoxy was such that even now, among Communist Chinese in the 
academy, his name is a symbol of tolerance and respect for other cultures. 
Orthodoxy as right beliefs 
So what is the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy? There are, in 
fact, two ways to take this question, internally, from within a particular 
religious perspective, and externally, from the perspective of an outsider. 
For a Muslim, for example, orthodox Muslim beliefs must be true beliefs. 
Jews also, however, can recognize that some Muslim beliefs are orthodox 
and others are heretical. To do so, the Jew need not grant that orthodox 
Muslim beliefs are true; he needs to grant only that they are taken to be 
true by orthodox Muslims. 
But to speak of orthodoxy from within a religious tradition requires 
accepting that some religious beliefs are true and others are not. Disputes 
about the legitimacy of the notion of orthodoxy are therefore connected to 
certain theological disputes about rea lism and irrealism with regard to the 
claims of a religion. For example, in a recent paper, "Realism and the 
Christian Faith," William Alston argues that George Santayana, Paul 
Tillich, and John Hick are all irrealists as far as religion goes and would 
reject the claim that some and only some religious beliefs are true." If we as 
adherents to a religious tradition take some religious beliefs to be ortho-
dox, then we will have to reject this position of these theologiansY We will 
have to hold that there is a fact of the matter in the realm of religion, and 
that religious statements have a truth-value. In that case, given the diverse 
and incompatible set of religious statements, some of the religious state-
ments human beings have made will be true and others will not; not all 
religious beliefs will be right. 
Orthodoxy as central claims of a religion 
The distinction between orthodoxy and heresy, of course, requires more than 
just supposing that some beliefs pertaining to a religion are true and others 
aren't. Another presupposition of the distinction is the idea that religions can 
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have an order or structure to them. The same point applies also to secular 
worldviews. Among the claims included as true in a particular philosophical 
or political position, some will be central to that position, constitutive of it, 
and others will not. On this way of thinking about the matter, the claims that 
constitute orthodoxy are the central, rather than the peripheral, claims of a 
religion or worldview. Furthermore, people can be mistaken about what 
these claims are. Not everything that anyone takes to be a central claim of a 
religion or worldview really is central to it. Devout Muslims can be wrong 
about what counts as a central claim for Islam, for example. 
For present purposes, we can think of this understanding of a religion as 
a matter of taking a religion doctrinally. 
It is also possible, however, to take a religion or world view sociological-
ly, in the sense that we take the religion or worldview to be whatever the 
adherents of the religion at any time suppose it to be. l4 On this way of 
understanding a religion, a devout Muslim couldn't be mistaken about 
what the central claims of Islam are. They are what he thinks they are. 
Our understanding of a worldview or religion will differ markedly 
depending on which way we take it. 
Suppose we ask, for example, whether Confucianism is compatible with 
Buddhism. Our answer will vary depending on which way we take 
Confucianism. If we take Confucianism sociologically to refer to all the 
claims held as Confucian by those who took themselves to be Confucian, 
then we are likely to suppose that the question whether Confucianism is 
compatible with Buddhism can be answered only by historical or sociolog-
ical research. Sociologically considered, those who took themselves to be 
Confucians have frequently been favorably inclined towards Buddhism 
and seen no conflict between Buddhism and their Confucianism. So, for 
instance, in the eighteenth century, in the middle of the Ching period, the 
Ch'ien-Iung emperor, who was strongly committed to Confucianism, 
began each day with a devotion to the Buddha.ls On the other hand, not all 
Confucians took such an attitude. Earlier, at the start of Manchu rule in the 
middle of the seventeenth century, the literati argued that true 
Confucianism required the rejection of Buddhism. On a sociological under-
standing of Confucianism, we can say only that Confucianism has been 
sympathetic to Buddhism at some times and not at others. If we take 
Confucianism in this way, we will have to hold that the seventeenth-centu-
ry Confucians were confused or even just historically naive in taking 
Confucianism to be incompatible with Buddhism. 
But the seventeenth-century Confucians weren't historically naive. In 
fact, it was precisely their historical knowledge that led them to take the 
attitude they did; they thought that their Ming predecessors had declined 
morally and lost the rule of the Empire in part because they had abandoned 
true Confucianism for a syncretistic substitute. These seventeenth-century 
Confucians were taking Confucianism doctrinally, rather than sociological-
ly, and in their view Confucianism doctrinally understood required the 
rejection of those Buddhist claims which had been assimilated to 
Confucianism at the end of the Ming dynasty in the late sixteenth century.l6 
Some contemporary scholars of religion reject the idea of taking a religion 
or worldview doctrinally and suppose that there is no legitimate alternative 
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to taking it sociologically.'7 But this position seems to me implausible. 
Consider, for example, Maoist political theory. Among the claims asso-
ciated with Maoist theory is the claim that revolutionary fervor declines in 
old age; another Maoist claim is that in ChiI,a the main or most important 
revolutionaries are peasants in rural areas. Those familiar with 
Communism and twentieth-century China would, I think, take a Maoist 
who denied the second of these claims to be holding a very unorthodox 
Maoist position. An important part of what distinguishes Maoist from 
Leninist political theory is the focus on the rural rather than the urban 
underclass. A different judgment is called for, however, in the case of the 
first claim. Even a very orthodox Maoist might part company with Mao on 
that score. A Maoist who supposed that revolutionary fervor was just as 
great in old people as in the young would not thereby be an unorthodox 
Maoist. He might still suppose that perpetual revolution generated by 
those in rural areas was necessary, but he would think it might be made by 
revolutionaries of any age. 
Accepting the legitimacy of the notion of orthodoxy requires supposing 
that it is possible to take worldviews doctrinally and that some claims are 
central to particular worldviews, doctrinally understood. The claim that 
China's revolution is dependent on the rural peasantry is central to Mao's 
version of Marxism, as the claim about revolutionary fervor's relation to 
age is not. From a Maoist point of view, denial of either of these claims is 
false; but only the denial of the one about the peasantry is unorthodox. 
It's important to point out here that nothing in the view that some 
claims are central to a worldview requires us to suppose that all the impli-
cations of those claims are always understood by the adherents of that 
worldview, or even by the creator of it. So, for example, although Mao 
always maintained that literature and the other arts must serve the needs 
of the proletariat, it wasn't until the 1970's that he carne to see that some 
works, such as the classic novel Water Margin, which various Maoists had 
repudiated as tainted by feudal and Confucian values, could nonetheless 
be thought of as serving the people because such works could be taken as 
teaching by "negative example. illS This later position of Mao's allowed him 
to continue to demand that literature be ancillary to Communist concerns 
without requiring him also to jettison much that the Chinese had tradition-
ally been proud of in their literary heritage. Given the great value Mao set 
on Chinese culture and his demand that the arts serve the people, his claim 
that the arts can teach by negative example is implicit in his original core 
beliefs. Here there is an interval of decades only between the original core 
claims and their later explicit elaboration. Some medieval Franciscans sup-
posed that the interval might stretch to centuries. 
The importance and usefulness of the view that only some claims 
included as true in a worldview are central to it can be seen by considering 
what can happen when we reject such a view. If we reject it, there is a dan-
ger that the denial of any of the claims included as true in a worldview will 
seem equally as serious as the denial of any other. 
For example, in the thirteenth century Peter John Olivi held as one of his 
Christian beliefs the view that quantity is not something distinct from the 
parts of a substance. This metaphysical view shapes his theory of the 
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Eucharist. Called to account by the Church authorities for this theory, Olivi 
defended himself by arguing that his claims about quantity were peripheral 
rather than central to Christian doctrine and that therefore even if his claims 
about quantity were false, they shouldn't cOlmt as heretical. He says, 
I do not want to see those things which do not directly affect the arti-
cles of our faith treated or held as if they were themselves articles of 
faith. Such things should rather be treated as ancillary to it. ... In 
such matters no single opinion should be advanced as the faith, for 
unless I am mistaken about such matters (which I do not believe) 
dangers of the highest sort lurk in such an assertion .... '') 
He seems to me entirely right here. The Church authorities of his day, 
who were not as clear as they should have been on the distinction between 
beliefs central to a world view and those peripheral to it, burned four 
Franciscan spirituals at the stake in Marseilles in 1318 because they refused 
to obey Church authorities about the length of Franciscan cloaks (among 
other issues)?' Even if one of the competing claims about the right length of 
Franciscan cloaks had been true, it seems the height of absurdity to suppose 
that Christianity requires the acceptance of that claim or that failure to obey 
Church authorities on this issue warrants death by burning. This sort of 
absurdity didn't vanish with the Middle Ages. At Mao's death one of the 
groups competing for power was called 'the Whatever Faction', because the 
members of that group were corrunitted to maintaining as true, and com-
pulsory for all Chinese to believe, anything Mao said, whatever it was. 
H we accept the notion of orthodoxy and with it the recognition that not 
all the claims included as true in a worldview are central to it, it becomes 
easier to recognize the dreadful folly represented by the Whatever Faction 
or the fourteenth-century Church authorities responsible for the Marseilles 
burning. 
Orthodoxy and pluralism 
As I said at the outset, our awareness of and attitudes towards the great 
plurality of religions and other worldviews has made some theologians 
wary of claims of orthodoxy. Since the claims a particular religion main-
tains as orthodox are those the religion holds to be true and central, the 
partisans of that religion in claiming orthodoxy for their views seem to 
take a disrespectful attitude towards different beliefs held by their co-reli-
gionists and, by extension, towards all religions incompatible with their 
own. Some theologians consequently suppose that claims of orthodoxy are 
arrogant or even sinful. So, for example, Gordon Kaufman says, 
If we try to overcome and control the mystery within which we 
live-for example, through philosophical or theological ideas in 
which we take ourselves to be in a position to present conclusive evi-
dences and arguments, or through religious rituals or practices which 
promise us a secure place in the ultimate scheme of things-we sin 
against God .... 2! 
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Kaufman recommends instead "a certain agnosticism," a recognition that 
religious matters are an "ultimate mystery."" 
Now it is certainly true that a parochial focus on what is taken to be the 
orthodoxy of one's own religion can lead a person to be arrogant or disre-
spectful to others. But it's not at all clear that simply maintaining some 
beliefs as orthodox entails disrepect towards adherents of other views. As 
I said in my first qualification, it is important to make a distinction between 
attitudes towards persons and attitudes towards their beliefs. Respect and 
sympathy are attitudes shown primarily towards persons and only secon-
darily or derivatively towards systems of belief. To say that one is in sym-
pathy with Marxism, for example, is just to say that one is inclined to feel 
about things as committed Marxists do, or that one can understand how 
somebody in certain circumstances could come to believe what Marxists 
believe. And an adherent of one world view could clearly feel respect for 
an adherent of a different worldview without actually feeling about things 
as the other does. Aquinas, for example, wasn't in the least tempted to 
adopt Islam but nonetheless had enormous respect for Avicenna. To sup-
pose that we can't respect persons with whose religious worldviews we 
disagree is to make precisely the sort of mistake responsible for a great deal 
of religious warfare. 
Furthermore, if, contrary to what I've just argued, respect is a function 
of sharing beliefs, then it isn't at all clear that an agnostic of the Kaufman 
variety who rejects the notion of orthodoxy will tum out to be more 
respectful of others than a proponent of the orthodoxy of a particular reli-
gion will be. Kaufman's agnosticism requires us to hold that all the claims 
on the part of the world's major religions to know some religious truth are 
not true. Even so parochial a medieval as Aquinas wouldn't have repudi-
ated other religions so drastically. He, at any rate, supposes that Christians 
share significant religious knowledge not only with Jews and Muslims but 
even with polytheistic pagans. Unlike the agnostic of Kaufman's sort, 
Aquinas is willing to suppose that adherents of non-Christian religions 
know some religious truths.21 So even if we tie respect to systems of belief 
rather than persons, it's hard to see Kaufman's agnosticism as the more tol-
erant or respectful position here since such an agnostic has to reject many 
more claims to know religious truth on the part of the adherents of some 
religion than the non-agnostic adherents of other religions do. 
Finally, it is worth noticing that in order to have a plurality of religions, 
we have to have different groups which accept the notion of orthodoxy 
and which suppose themselves to know at least some orthodox truths. The 
distinctions among religions are in part a function of their differing under-
standings of what is to count as orthodox. The plurality of religions would 
be at least significantly diminished if the differing groups all gave up any 
claim to orthodoxy. In fact, we couldn't even have agnosticism if we aban-
doned the notion of orthodoxy. Like religious believers, the agnostic, too, 
has some claims he takes to be true and central to his position-for exam-
ple, the claim that we don't know the truth with regard to religion. 
Someone who advertised himself as an agnostic but who rejected the claim 
that we don't know religious truth would himself be rejected by the agnos-
tics he was trying to associate with. In agnosticism, too, there is an ortho-
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doxy. Accepting the notion of orthodoxy therefore seems to be necessary 
in order to have any coherent worldview at all. 
Orthodoxy and heresy 
One further preliminary point is helpful here. What is being opposed to 
orthodoxy in this context is not unorthodoxy or even heterodoxy. It's 
heresy, and heresy is a contrary, not a contradictory, opposite of ortho-
doxy. Something which is heretical isn't orthodox, and something which is 
orthodox isn't heretical; but there can be many religious beliefs which are 
neither orthodox nor heretical. We might suppose that heresy consists in 
the rejection of any claim which a religion or worldview includes as both 
true and central to it."4 But heresy is a complicated notion, and this charac-
terization still hasn't got it quite right. Even for claims that are not only 
included as true in but also central to a worldview, it isn't necessarily the 
case that the rejection of one of them is tantamount to heresy. Aquinas, for 
example, cites with approval a view held by Augustine, the great heresy-
fighter of his time: "By no means should we accuse of heresy those who, 
however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obsti-
nate fervor, and seek the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their 
opinion when they have found the truth."25 And this holds, in Aquinas's 
view, not only with regard to religious matters peripheral to faith, but also 
with regard to claims that are central to the faith. 
We must be careful not to let the quotation mislead us; Aquinas's opin-
ions about heresy are more nearly like Mao's in the Hundred Flowers cam-
paign than they are like those of liberal American academics. In Aquinas's 
view, all it takes to count as defending a position with obstinate fervor or 
failing to seek the truth with sufficient anxiety is standing against the 
authority of the Roman Church. But what is interesting and worth noting 
here is the distinction Aquinas makes between unorthodoxy-even in 
claims he takes to be central to Christianity-and heresy. For a person's 
belief to count as heresy he must also know that a certain position is one 
held to be central by the Church and decide, nonetheless, to reject it.26 
If Aquinas is willing to be tolerant towards those who "seek the truth 
with careful anxiety," why does he take so negative an attitude towards 
those who go against the authority of the Church? Why couldn't those 
who reject the Church's teachings also count as people who were seeking 
the truth with careful anxiety and thinking that they'd found it, but else-
where than among the Church's teachings? 
The answer to these questions is not hard to see, I think. Aquinas sup-
poses that in matters of theology as in all other areas of human thought 
there is such a thing as expertise. And he takes the expertise of many gen-
erations of theological thinkers reflecting on revelation and tradition to be 
expressed in the teachings of the Church, teachings which were built up 
gradually through the labor and thought of many different minds over a 
long period of time. To reject the teachings of the Church, then, is to sup-
pose that one person has got right what generations of thinkers, operating 
communally, have gotten wrong. For Aquinas, the determination of what 
counts as orthodoxy sterns from the expertise vested in a community. To 
ORTHODOXY AND HERESY 157 
hold out for one's own opinion against the cumulative results of that com-
munity can seem sinfully proud. 
I put this last point in a hedged way, because, unfortunately, it is clearly 
the case that sometimes a whole community goes wrong. This is what 
happened in the case of the Roman Catholic Church's opposition to Galileo 
when the Church authorities as a group were convinced that orthodoxy 
entailed a scientific position that, as it turned out, is false. 27 Furthermore, I 
think-and, no doubt, you do, too-that in the history of Christianity this 
is hardly the only occasion on which the whole community has gotten 
something wrong (though perhaps we wouldn't have exactly the same list 
of such occasions). What is orthodox is what is true and central to a world-
view, but our determinations of what is to count as orthodox are included 
in what we believe, and not always in what we know. Subsequent infor-
mation or reflection may show us that we have to revise what we have 
believed to be orthodox. 
There is, therefore, a tension between granting that expertise in determi-
nations of orthodoxy is vested in a community and recognizing that even 
communities can go wrong. 
Here I think there is one helpful point of analogy between a religious and 
a scientific community."8 We speak disapprovingly of unorthodox medical 
beliefs, for example, because we think-and quite correctly, too-that exper-
tise in medicine is vested in the medical community as a whole and that 
individuals choosing to reject a view held by the medical community at large 
are highly likely to be not only wrong but pridefully, obstinately, wrong. So 
in medicine we tend to be traditionalists, implicitly maintaining a position 
analogous to Aquinas's position on heresy. On the other hand, however, we 
know that occasionally the medical community as a whole is wrong and that 
a lone unorthodox individual has a more nearly correct view. So, for exam-
ple, the biologist who earlier in this century insisted that the Rous sarcoma, a 
cancer found largely in chickens, was caused by a virus was hounded for 
much of his career by the medical community for his unorthodox position. 
The Rous sarcoma was agreed by all researchers to run in families and be 
inheritable, and medical orthodoxy of the time held that no disease could be 
both inheritable and also caused by a virus. But because of the efforts of that 
supposedly unorthodox biologist, a major breakthough was made in our 
understanding of cancer, and we now know that cancers can result from the 
actions of genes and viruses simultaneously. 
Even with our knowledge of such notable cases as that involving the 
Rous sarcoma, however, most of us would still be inclined to side, most of 
the time, with the general consensus of the medical community in its pro-
nouncements about disease. That is, when it comes to medicine, most of us 
are still disposed to accept that expertise is vested in the medical communi-
ty as a whole. And this is a sensible position. It is much more likely that 
the cumulative results of the labors of a whole community be right than 
that any individual operating on his own outside that community could do 
better. 
And if this seems generally right as regards medicine, then perhaps, 
with additional caveats for the effects of passion in religion, a similar atti-
tude is appropriate in religion. In fact, there is more reason for adopting 
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such an attitude with regard to Christianity than medicine. If there is a 
long-established Christian consensus that some claim is true and central to 
Christianity, and you (or you and your little group) in the late twentieth 
century have discovered that it is false, then we have to wonder about the 
providence of God, who let so many generations of Christians be deceived 
about an important matter of faith. 2" And we may equally wonder what it 
is about you (or your group) that this truth should be revealed to you 
although it wasn't revealed to many Christians before you, at least some of 
whom were conceivably smarter, better in character, or stronger in faith 
than you. 
The distinction between orthodoxy and heresy 
So I think the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy is a good one 
and worth preserving. 
There is an objective fact of the matter with regard to religion, and some 
religious statements, those which track that fact of the matter, are true. 
Among the claims included as true in a worldview, some are central to that 
worldview, taken doctrinally, and others are only peripheral to it. Those 
which are included as true in a worldview and which are in fact central to 
it constitute the orthodoxy of that worldview.30 
The plurality of religions in the world means that religious believers will 
have differing views about what counts as orthodoxy in religion. 
Nonetheless, rejection of the beliefs of religions other than one's own is com-
patible with great respect towards the adherents of those other religions. 
Respect is an attitude shown primarily towards individuals, and only 
derivately towards beliefs. But if respect were an attitude shown towards 
systems of beliefs, too, then there would be more respect shown towards 
other religions by a religiously orthodox adherent of the orthodoxy of one of 
those religions than by those who reject the notion of orthodoxy altogether. 
Not every unorthodox belief is heretical; more than the rejection of a 
belief which is orthodox is required for heresy. For a belief to count as 
heretical, it is also necessary that the person holding that belief recognize 
that it has been rejected as unorthodox by a long-established consensus of 
the accepted experts in the religious community. 
Furthermore, it is sadly clear that the accepted experts can be wrong 
about what counts as central to a religion, as well as what counts as true. 
So while rejecting their consensus about orthodoxy is a necessary condition 
for heresy, it isn't sufficient. One can reject the consensus and not hold a 
heretical belief, if the consensus is mistaken about which of the beliefs 
accepted as true by the religion are central to it.31 Olivi's view on quantity 
wasn't heretical even though it went against the consensus of medieval 
theologians regarding Christian orthodoxy, because the negation of that 
view, even if it were true, isn't central to Christianity. 
On the other hand, although it is not guaranteed to be right, the cumula-
tive consensus of a community of experts is more likely to be right than the 
views of one individual (or one small group) alone. From the point of view 
of Christianity, while it is possible that God would allow his church to be 
deceived for centuries about what is true and central to faith, leaving the 
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truth to be discovered by a lone individual or his group in the twentieth 
century, the thought that God has actually done so isn't one that we should 
arrive at lightly. 
There are a great many other issues that need to be addressed in order 
really to understand the nature of the distinction between orthodoxy and 
heresy. For example, we'd need to ask how long a consensus has to be in 
place before it counts as long-established. We'd need to know how to tell 
the experts from those who think they're experts but aren't. Is expertise a 
matter of education and training? Or is it instead a matter of saintliness? Or 
are both required? Or is it even possible to tell who the experts are without 
a kind of vicious circularity? If virtuous and well-educated Donatists dis-
agree with the rest of the Christian world, we don't conclude that there is 
no consensus; rather, we discount Donatist views as heresy. But then it 
seems as if we have to know what counts as orthodoxy before we can tell 
whom to include among the experts. Or, to look at the same problem from 
a somewhat different angle, what about all the internal lack of consensus 
on apparently crucial matters? The wars of religion weren't fought over 
nothing, even if it sometimes looks that way. What happens to orthodoxy 
if there is no consensus? And there are other questions as well. 
Nonetheless, I think that this is enough for my purposes here. I need to get 
just clear enough about the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy to 
articulate my thesis about it, to which I want finally to tum. 
The thesis: advice to Christian philosophers 
I think contemporary Christian philosophers should reflect on the dis-
tinction between orthodoxy and heresy. They should do so not in order to 
police their ranks, trying to weed out or put pressure on the heretics. As I 
said at the beginning, the notion of a heretic is not a useful one, and it is 
pernicious in the extreme to try to promote orthodoxy through political 
pressure of any sort. In my view, contemporary Christian philosophers 
should think about orthodoxy and heresy not in order to take the mote out 
of somebody else's work and thought but in order to ask themselves 
whether there is any beam in their own. 
For this purpose, I think that Christian philosophers should be willing 
to put some time and effort into learning about the history of Christian phi-
losophy and theology. Whatever the difficulties of determining the experts 
and their agreements, they're considerably magnified by ignorance of the 
historical tradition. 
And then I think that we should care if we find ourselves disagreeing 
with that tradition, or even with some large or important part of iU2 
So my thesis is simple. Christian philosophers should know enough 
about their tradition to have some idea when they are at odds with it; and 
when they are at odds with it, or some significant part of it, they should care. 
The third qualification 
Somebody might suppose that I'm recommending a reactionary, hide-
bound, slavish deference to religious tradition, which would impede all 
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progress in philosophical theology and its related disciplines. But this isn't 
quite right. 
If we were to give up views that we have arrived at by seeking what 
seems to us the truth in matters of religion just because those views dis-
agreed with the tradition, then we'd be doing to ourselves what I said was 
pernicious to do to others. If it's pernicious to bring political pressure, or 
even peer pressure, to bear on someone to get him to adopt certain beliefs, 
it's equally destructive to love of truth to let ourselves be pressured by tra-
dition into accepting beliefs that go contrary to what earnest, hard-working 
seeking for truth leads us to believe must be the case. 
So if we find that the beliefs we have laboriously and carefully acquired 
go contrary to the tradition, or some large part of the tradition, I think we 
must hold on to our views. Even if it were possible to will to give up beliefs 
in this sort of way, to give up our beliefs in deference to the tradition 
would be a Pyrrhic victory for the tradition, as the whole sad history of 
politics and Christian belief shows. In this fallen world, love of truth is 
more precious than success in getting religious doctrine right, however 
important right religious doctrine is. 
Conclusion and consolation 
On the other hand, although, as I said above, the experts have been 
wrong in the past, when we disagree with the tradition, or some significant 
part of it, there is another possibility which we ought to take seriously. It 
might be that what has been responsible for beliefs of ours that are at odds 
with the tradition is not just a laborious, earnest process on our part of seek-
ing for the truth. Perhaps stupidity also came into it. Perhaps there was igno-
rance or obliviousness or any of a number of other non-culpable epistemic 
faults.33 Or maybe there were even culpable faults. Maybe there was careless-
ness, inattention, or neglect. It's also not outside the realm of possibility that 
pride, willfulness, or even perversity played some very small role. 
Even if we must not give up our beliefs in deference to the tradition in 
such cases, then, I think we should care about our disagreement with the 
tradition. Love of truth isn't compatible with blind obedience to tradition, 
but it is compatible with wondering whether our efforts at finding truth 
have been (non-culpably) inadequate or even marred by sin. 
So besides historical literacy in the Christian tradition, I'm recommend-
ing care and worry when we disagree with it-care and worry, but not 
guilt. Just as Mao thought that the feudal literature of an earlier period 
could serve the proletariat by "negative example," so Augustine thought 
that heretics performed a valuable service for the church.34 The church 
would never search out so zealously the understanding that supports faith, 
Augustine thought, if it weren't driven to do so by the need to answer 
heretics. So if in spite of our best efforts to find the truth in matters of reli-
gion we fall into heresy, we have that best of Protestant consolations: we 
will still be useful,35 
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